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Patenting expanded rapidly across the post bellum South as its transportation 
network filled in and city growth extended markets.  This was consistent with Sokoloff 
and Khan (1990), who demonstrated the elastic supply of patentable ideas in early 
America.  Successful innovation required that inventors could or did sell their property 
rights through “assignment” to those who commercialized new technology.  The 
assignment characteristics of 1912 southern patents were examined.  Southern “border” 
state patents had a higher rate of marketable assignments than those issued to residents in 
the Deep South.  Greater commercialization of patents in border state cities accounted for 
most of this difference.   
 
A notable characteristic of early industrialization in the United States was the 
rapid spread of patenting in the Northern States before the Civil War.  Documented by 
Sokoloff and Khan (1990), this expansion encouraged entrepreneurship in developing 
new products and processes to bring to market.  From the beginning of the new nation, 
the public policy of an accessible patent system made clear that “creative destruction” 
would be welcomed.  At the same time, patent activity in the antebellum American South 
languished relative to the northern region.  Poor transport networks and a lack of cities 
constrained market size for products other than the great export staples.  Although these 
staples created strong economic growth, widespread entrepreneurship was discouraged 
due to the lack of small-scale profit opportunities. 
Surprising then that after the Civil War, as the southern economy entered its 
extended relative decline, inventive activity in the region finally began to flourish.  
Patenting in the post bellum South spread across the region much as it had in the 
antebellum North.  How can this patenting boom be reconciled with the South’s 
economic problems, and why did it not lead to rapid economic growth?  While 
encouraging on its own terms, this southern expansion of inventive activity had less Democratization of Invention-2   
entrepreneurial potential in the post bellum market for technology that had developed in 
America. 
The southern growth in depth and breadth of patenting is demonstrated below, 
while the second part of the paper will outline the evolution of the post bellum patent 
system described by Lamoreaux, Sokoloff and Levenstein (1999, 2003, 2006).  Southern 
inventors after the Civil War needed to succeed in a national technology market.  
Furthermore, successful inventors increasingly had to get support from a social network 
for technology development that was located in the northern states.  A database of 
southern patents in 1912 is classified based on these ideas, and in the third part of the 
paper, is analyzed for its regional and urban patterns within the South.  It is found that 
despite the spread of raw patent activity throughout the post bellum South, innovations 
from the urban areas of the “border” states displayed a much higher degree of 
commercialization.  This implies that post bellum patents originating in the Deep South 
were relatively disconnected from the new American technology market.  A final section 
looks at future research directions to examine the causes of this disconnect and its impact 
on southern economic development. 
THE GROWTH OF PATENTING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
Overall Patent Growth Relative to the North 
The per capita rate of patenting in the southern region was dramatically lower 
than for other areas of the United States.  Lamoreaux and Sokoloff calculated a southern 
patenting rate of 5.5 per million residents in the 1840s.  This was merely 20 percent of 
the national average of 27.5 per million(1999, Table 1).  Although the propensity to Democratization of Invention-3   
patent in the South tripled in the prosperous 1850s to 15.5 patents per million, it was 
falling further behind relative to the U.S. average of 91.5 patents per million. 
But after the Civil War, patenting in the South showed the same dramatic 
acceleration over antebellum levels seen in the northern states, and even improved its 
relative patenting rate to one-third of the American norm.  Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
found a southern propensity to patent of 114.4 per million in 1910-11, compared to 334.2 
per million nationally.  In particular, the South’s inventors closed the gap with the 
traditional regional patent leaders, New England and the Middle Atlantic states.  Only if 
judged by the growth in patenting rates in the West and West North Central did the South 
appear to lag, as these developing regions raised their patenting rates to around the U.S. 
average by World War I.
1
The absolute growth in southern inventive activity over time was charted in 
Figure 1.  The influence of business cycles was smoothed over with 10-year averages, 
except for the removal of the Civil War years, and lack of data beyond 1912.  Without the 
sharp reduction of 1856-65 per capita patenting (centered at 1860 in the figure) that 
would have occurred if the War interruption were included, the southern rise in 
innovation was consistent with random variations around a constant growth rate of 
propensity to patent over the entire period.  The largest number of annual southern 
patents before the War was 474 in 1860, which marked the ninth straight year of increase.  
In 1866, the Southern states accounted for 269 patents, the third highest total ever, 
followed by a new record of 490 patents in 1867.  Three new records were set in 
                                                 
1 Carlton and Coclanis (1995), responded to a regression of Robert Higgs (1971) in which the South was 
significantly deficient in patenting after 1900 compared to other states.  They found that the apparent lack 
of southern inventiveness (relative to urbanization and other control factors) went away when a dummy for 
western and great plains states was included.  The distinctive region of America in turn-of-the century 
patenting was the West, and its unusually high inventiveness compared to its small urban population.   Democratization of Invention-4   
succeeding years, before the peak of 840 patents in 1870 was dampened by weak 
business cycle conditions in the early 1870s.  There was no sign in this growth that the 
Civil War had any impact on long-term patenting activity in the South. 
Internal Distribution of Southern Patenting Growth 
Antebellum southern patenting was dominated by the states of Virginia and 
Kentucky.  As populous states whose early transportation networks allowed invention to 
disperse into rural counties, they combined for a half of the region’s annual patent output 
as late as 1855.  Outside of these states, patenting in the South during this period was 
dependent on inventions coming out of major urban areas like Charleston and New 
Orleans.  Did the post bellum growth of the propensity to patent in the South lack 
breadth, and only reflect a rise in innovation among these antebellum leaders? 
Table 1 displays the geographic dispersion of invention rates by southern state for 
the periods 1836-45 and 1906-12.  Virginia and Kentucky had the second and third 
highest propensities to patent before the Civil War, while Louisiana’s leadership rested 
on innovative activity in New Orleans.  By this period, Charleston had already entered 
into its relative decline, yet its inventions still put South Carolina’s per capita patent rate 
above the average for the Deep South.  Over 1836 to 1845, border state innovativeness in 
Virginia and Kentucky (8.42 per million) doubled the invention rate in the lower South 
(4.22 per million). 
By the 1906-12 period, patenting in the border states had increased by more than 
a factor of 15 to 134.69 annual patents per million.  However, the propensity to invent 
across the Deep South had risen even more rapidly to about 70 percent of the border state 
rate.  Texas and Florida were now among the South’s leading patenting states, while Democratization of Invention-5   
Tennessee, Georgia and North Carolina had dramatically narrowed the gap with the 
traditional leaders.  The growth of southern inventive activity after the war had spread out 
geographically across its several states. 
Table 2 addresses the spread of patenting away from the major southern cities into 
the hinterlands.  Over the period 1846 to 1855, Charleston residents accounted for half of 
South Carolina’s patents, while New Orleans had over three-fourths of Louisiana’s 
inventions.  On a per capita basis, Charleston’s patenting rate was over 15 times the 
hinterland rate, while in Louisiana, New Orleans held a ten-fold advantage.  By 1912 
Charleston had less than ten percent of South Carolina’s patents, while New Orleans’ 
share of Louisiana was down to forty percent.  Although these urban areas still had a 
dominant edge on a per capita basis, patenting in the rural areas of the respective states 
had risen to over one-third of the core metropolis, and absolutely was innovating at a 
faster rate than Charleston and New Orleans pre-war norms 
The final evidence on the breadth of post bellum southern patenting came from 
the percentage of southern counties reporting a patent over the period 1900 to 1912.  
Although in any single year, many relatively isolated southern counties would not have a 
resident patent recipient, these sporadic innovator counties changed from year to year, 
leading to a high percentage of patent recipient jurisdictions over the course of a few 
years.  Over all the 13 southern states studied, less than 5 percent of the counties lacked a 
patent from 1900 to 1912.  If Texas and its many non-patenting counties located near the 
Mexican and New Mexico borders were excluded, the percentage of non-patenting 
southern counties fell to around 3 percent.  The result was that many southern residents Democratization of Invention-6   
came to learn about local patent holders and would have understood that the patent 
system could be accessible to them or some of their neighbors. 
The Sokoloff-Kahn Model 
The post bellum southern increase in inventive activity was consistent with 
Sokoloff and Kahn’s model of the spread of antebellum patenting in the North.  Because 
the knowledge necessary for invention in this era was widely available to the general 
public, the limiting factor to patenting was the extent of markets needed to make the 
introduction of novel products profitable.  After the Civil War, as the South’s 
transportation network was filled in and its population (particularly in cities) grew, its 
patenting started to spread out into the lower South and deeper into non-urban counties.  
Phillips (1992) documented this spread within Virginia before 1880.  Wright(1986, pp. 
39-46) noted how the changed economic parameters of the post War South encouraged a 
rise in city formation, investment in railroad networks, and growth in manufacturing 
establishments.  According to Wright, entrepreneurship was re-channeled into location-
specific activities.  This meant that markets were created which accelerated inventive 
activity. 
A representation of the Sokoloff-Khan model of patenting is shown in Figure 2.  
Given the modest scientific expertise required for much of the technology of the time, the 
supply of patentable ideas was elastic.  The quantity of patents issued per period for a 
given market responded to the demand for new products and ideas driven by 
commercialization, expanded markets and the business cycle.  Another key to the 
elasticity in these markets was the fact that a successful patent application did not have to 
prove future commercial viability or that it was the most economical solution to a Democratization of Invention-7   
problem or need.  It only had to have some elements of novelty and usefulness on its own 
terms, in isolation from the other alternative ideas available. 
POST BELLUM TECHNOLOGY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Role of Assignments 
Recent research by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999) on the history of the 
American patent system shifted emphasis from its granting of temporary monopoly 
protection to the inventor.  Rather, they highlighted the system’s creation of a property 
right that could be used by the inventor as collateral for their own entrepreneurial efforts 
or to transfer their technology to others for commercialization.  A market for technology 
was created by the ability of the inventor to “assign” or sell full or partial rights to their 
invention.  Before the creation of national product markets, inventors typically 
commercialized their ideas locally and used assignments to effectively “license” their 
technology to entrepreneurs in other geographic regions.  But shortly after the Civil War, 
assignments primarily came to be used for two purposes: first a means by which financial 
partners were compensated for their venture capital, and second a means by which 
technology was sold to firms for commercialization. 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff demonstrated that (before World War I) the most 
productive patentees, in terms of number of patents and length of patenting career, were 
those who made a full sale of their patent rights to a company (1999, pp. 17-20 and 
Tables 7-8).  Since the rise of inventors as employees of a company was a post-1920s 
phenomena, most of these assignments were to a firm that (based on name) was at least 
partially the inventor’s own company, or to a firm that (based on name) was a company 
with no relationship to the inventor.  In this paper, these company assignments were Democratization of Invention-8   
labeled as marketable assignments.  The sale by the inventor of their property right to a 
non-associated firm was clear evidence of greater commercial viability than a patent that 
never attracted any outside interest.  The label of marketable to own-company 
assignments was more problematic.  This would include assignments like those of 
Thomas Edison (and other successful inventor-entrepreneurs) to their own enterprises, 
but also include the proto-typical “mad” inventor who hawked worthless shares of their 
own-company stock based on an unworkable idea. 
Assignments made for financial motives were not classified as marketable.  The 
most common example was the partial assignment (most typically one-half) of patent 
rights to an individual with no obvious relationship to the inventor.  Although interesting 
in their own right as evidence about venture capital markets, it was assumed that financial 
support was provided well before clear signs of commercial feasibility had been 
established.
2  Of less importance quantitatively were assignments to apparent relatives 
(based on name), and assignments by one co-inventor to another co-inventor, whether of 
full or partial patent rights.  Although these assignments may not have reflected purely 
financial transactions, there was no clear evidence of commercial success based on these 
property right transfers. 
The most difficult classification issue was the marketability of a full sale of patent 
rights to a non-related (at least based on name) individual.  Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
found some evidence in the early 1890s that patentees with these kind of assignments 
were productive, but not so in the early 1870s and just before World War I (1999, pp. 20-
                                                 
2 Many patent assignments to companies were transactions that replaced a previous financial support 
arrangement between an inventor and a partner.  Payments by companies for these assignments went not 
only to the inventor but also to the partner for their share of the patent rights.  Presumably venture 
capitalists supporting patents that never got these later company assignments did not do as well financially. Democratization of Invention-9   
21 and Table 8).  The sample sizes they worked with for these kinds of assignments were 
small, making conclusions difficult.  The lack of sale to a company made marketability 
seem less likely, but the full sale of rights made a purely venture capital relationship less 
probable.  These assignments were ultimately included as marketable ones, since this 
biased the results against the hypothesis of unequal marketability of patents in different 
regions of the South. 
The Database: Assigned Southern Patents in 1912 
From the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents, information was 
collected on all patents issued in 1912 to inventors or co-inventors residing in 13 southern 
states.  This yielded 2716 patents, of which as listed in Table 3, 501 had assignments at 
the time of issue.  The assignment rate at issue of 18.4% was comparable to the 22.7% at-
issue assignment rate found by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff for a sample of 322 southern 
patents from 1910-11 (1999, Table 3).  A major shortcoming of this paper’s database was 
that it did not include assignments made after issue.  Although Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
reported a falling percent of after-issue assignments over time, their review of contracts 
filed with the Patent Office in January 1911 showed that close to half of those relating to 
southern patents were after issue.
3    Only a follow-up search at the Patent Office for 
after-issue assignment contracts made in subsequent years for 1912 patents could confirm 
the results based on the at-issue data. 
The most typical at-issue southern assignment in 1912 was the partial assignment 
to an unrelated individual, accounting for a proportion of 52.5%.  Combined with small 
numbers of assignments to relatives and co-inventors, roughly 60 percent of the southern 
                                                 
3 Approximately 20 percent of the southern assignments were secondary, i.e. an assignment not from the 
original inventor, but from a previous assignee (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999, Table 2). Democratization of Invention-10   
assignments were not marketable.  The other 40 percent of the assignments were 
marketable, with assignments to independent companies making up a quarter of the 
assignments, and assignments to own companies just under 10 percent.
4  Full 
assignments to unrelated individuals, the most difficult to classify category, accounted for 
only 7 percent of southern assignments.  A remaining weakness in the data was inventors 
who could have assigned their patents rights but did not do so.  There were an unknown 
number of southern entrepreneurs who possibly made money off of their inventions 
locally in small businesses, but did not choose to assign their patent to a company bearing 
their name, retaining their rights as an individual inventor. 
The Patent System’s Assignment Market 
The maturing of the assignment market described by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
highlighted a narrower spectrum of the new technology created by the patent system.  
The ability to sell patents to companies provided a market test to identify patents showing 
the greatest potential to impact the new products and processes actually made and used in 
the economy.  This model for marketable assignments is displayed in Figure 3.  Because 
of the limited potential for successful new products and processes among any 
forthcoming batch of patents, the supply of marketable assignments was relatively 
inelastic compared to the supply of patents.  This meant that the market expansion that 
created dramatic increases in the propensity to patent might not lead in every region to 
large numbers of marketable assignments. 
The degree of marketable assignment response in a region depended on the 
relative elasticity of its marketable assignment supply.  This elasticity in turn depended 
                                                 
4 Percentages for these major categories were comparable to Lamoreaux and Sokoloff’s results for their 
1910-11 sample (1999, Table 3). Democratization of Invention-11   
on factors such as a region’s human capital environment, its transportation infrastructure, 
the industrial mix of its products, and its degree of urbanization.  A final determinant of 
marketable assignment response would be the absence or presence of a social network for 
commercializing innovation.
5  Figure 3 assumes that the post bellum American patent 
system did not have a network in which the participants in the market interacted to 
improve their long-term outcomes.  This was a technology market of arms-length 
relationships between inventors supplying new technologies, businesses purchasing new 
technologies, and intermediaries such as patent attorneys providing secure property rights 
to buyers and sellers. 
The post bellum American technology market did not maintain these arms-length 
relationships.  Instead, as described by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2003), intermediaries 
such as patent lawyers started to use their informational advantages to match inventors 
and potential buyers of their patents.  Except for the acknowledged scams that were 
inevitable whenever principals and agents transacted business, the most successful 
intermediaries scouted out the most promising inventors and connected them with 
growing businesses that would be the most interested in their research.  Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff found that patentees matched in this way produced more patents, assigned more 
of their patents, and sold their inventions more quickly.  Analysis of an active patent 
lawyer’s diaries showed that these intermediaries could move beyond simple matching 
and start to pass inside information between businesses and inventors about what 
innovations they might like to buy and sell in the future.
6
                                                 
5 The use of the term “social network” for facilitating innovation comes from Cook (2007), who cites 
Castillio and Hwang et al (2000). 
6 Much of this information was later internalized by firms in the corporate R&D lab. Democratization of Invention-12   
Further research by Lamoreaux, Levenstein and Sokoloff (2006) of Cleveland, 
Ohio at the turn of the century demonstrated that this social network could expand to 
create ‘incubator’ firms such as the Brush Electric Company that attracted migrating 
inventors and connected them to local venture capitalists.  This created a circle of patent 
attorneys, prolific inventors, firms producing innovative products, and business people 
eager to invest in promising research.  The result was acceleration in the rate of inventive 
activity as the nineteenth century progressed, but also an increasing specialization in who 
achieved entrepreneurial success through invention.  Those who patented new ideas 
needed to attract the attention of knowledgeable people and firms in this market for 
technology in order to obtain proper financing or purchase of their invention by those 
best positioned to commercialize it.  Figure 4 shows the hypothetical assignment market 
for a region with such a social network.  The result was that market expansion would 
create a greater expansion of marketable assignments compared to areas where inventors 
and businesses could only react to publicly-available information. 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SOUTHERN MARKETABLE 
ASSIGNMENTS: 1912 
Since the social network described above was centered in the major industrial 
centers of the northern United States, it was expected that southern patents would lack 
marketable assignments as a result.  This disadvantage would be on top of other factors 
limiting the commercial success of southern inventions, such as a smaller human capital 
base, and industrial concentration on matured technology products.  Although a direct 
comparison with northern marketable assignments was not possible with the southern 
database, Table 4 can compare the per capita rate of marketable assignments by the Democratization of Invention-13   
different southern states.  It was found that with the exception of Florida, the rate of 
commercial assignments in the border states of West Virginia, Kentucky and Virginia 
dominated those of the Deep South.  Given the more equal rates of raw patenting activity 
evident in Table 1 for this period, the disparity in marketable assignment rates was 
largely accounted for by the greater percentage of border state patents that had a 
marketable assignment at issue.
7
Except for the extra-large state of Texas, the southern border states also 
dominated the Deep South in the absolute number of marketable assignments.  Whereas 
the high marketable assignment rates of the border states were not overly dependent on 
the assignments from any one location, the majority of Florida’s marketable assignments 
in 1912 came from the boom town of Jacksonville.  The robustness of Florida’s 
commercialization of patents would need to be confirmed by adding adjacent years to the 
database.  The last column of the table lists the per capita rate of total assignments by 
state, including those assumed to be primarily for financial reasons.  By this measure, the 
gap between the border and non-border states was reduced, but except for Florida and 
Texas, the border states still clearly had higher assignment rates than the average 
southern state. 
Table 5 looks at the issue of whether the border state advantage in marketable 
assignments can be explained by a greater degree of urbanization.  Urbanized counties in 
each state were selected based on the presence of a city with 30,000 population in 1910, 
                                                 
7 Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999, Table 3) for their 1910-11 samples reported by region the percentage of 
patents assigned, and the percentage of those assignments to a company.  This implied that the minimum 
percentage of marketable assignments by region was: New England 37.5%; Middle Atlantic 26.2%; East 
North Central 14.7%; West North Central 8.1%; South 7.8%; and West 8.9%.  Their southern percentage 
was consistent with the average of the marketable assignment percentages reported in Table 4 of the text. Democratization of Invention-14   
or high-assignment counties located next to urbanized areas.
8  Over all the counties of the 
three border states, the rate of marketable assignments was 15.43 per million, compared 
to only 5.61 per million for the 10 states of the Deep South.  When each region was 
divided into urban and rural county areas, it was found that the low rates of marketable 
assignments in rural locations were similar in both the border and Deep South states.  
Most of the difference in the higher assignment rate of the border states was due to a 
much higher rate of marketable assignments in border state urban areas (61.45 per million 
versus 22.39 per million).
9  These high-assignment urban counties in Kentucky and West 
Virginia were located at or near the industrial centers of Louisville, Cincinnati, and 
Wheeling, right on the border with the North.  Only the state of Virginia showed high 
rates of patent commercialization away from the immediate border, with many 
marketable assignments coming from Norfolk, Richmond and Lynchburg, in addition to 
its Washington, D.C. suburbs. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Before the Civil War, raw patent activity in the American South was exceedingly 
rare.  This activity was in addition concentrated in the two most industrial states, 
Kentucky and the antebellum Virginia that included the later state of West Virginia.  
Further South, the inventiveness in other southern states mainly emanated from a small 
scattered collection of major cities.  The result was that most people in the antebellum  
South would not have had an opportunity to meet a local resident who had patented. 
                                                 
8 Examples include Alexandria County, Virginia, located next to Washington, D.C., or DeKalb County, 
Georgia, located next to Atlanta. 
9 The only urbanized Deep South county to have a marketable assignment rate above the average urbanized 
border state rate was Duval (Jacksonville), which for reasons given in the text might be a temporary 
occurrence. Democratization of Invention-15   
This situation changed dramatically after the Civil War. The initial act of 
obtaining a patent for new technology thrived in the post bellum South.  Virginia, its new 
neighbor of West Virgina, and Kentucky’s relative share of per-capita patenting all 
declined, as several states in the lower South closed the gap with the border states despite 
the high absolute growth in inventiveness near the Mason-Dixon line.  The extreme 
dominance of the older commercial centers in Deep South invention declined, as rural 
counties throughout the South saw residents receive patents, it not every year, at least 
over the course of a few years.  By its very nature, the awarding of patents was an elite 
occurrence, but inventiveness in the South did ‘democratize’ in the sense that residents 
would have learned that patents were not reserved just for the far-away scientific giants 
like Edison. 
The database of assignments to Southern patents in 1912 demonstrates that when 
it came to commercialization of new technology, the states of the Deep South still lagged 
far behind the border states.  The pattern was similar to the lower South’s gap in raw 
patenting that existed in antebellum times.  The research of Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
would indicate that the per capita rate of marketable assignments in the northern states 
was in turn much higher than those of the border states.  This made it much more likely 
that rapid city growth based on rising new technologies would at the turn of the century 
occur in the North, as in the case with Cleveland, rather than in a ‘New South’ metropolis 
such as Atlanta. 
In related work, Khan and Sokoloff (1993) documented the relationship between 
high geographical mobility and “great inventors”.  Technology market success was 
related to those who moved when needed to regions where invention rates and Democratization of Invention-16   
commercialization rates of those inventions was high.  Although the overall level of 
migration from the South to the North before World War I was still low (Wright 1986, 
chaps. 6-7), the incentives for “brain drain” exit by prolific Southern inventors was 
growing.  This would compound the South’s lack of a local technology community, cited 
by Wright as a factor making it difficult for Southern industry to adapt advanced 
technology to southern conditions. 
Future research would need to expand the database to additional years to check 
for robustness.  After-issue assignments have to be checked to ensure that Deep South 
inventors did not quickly catch-up in commercialization in later years after the patent was 
awarded.  How much of the marketable assignment gap or delay in the Deep South was 
due to human capital deficiencies, lack of infrastructure or other fundamental factors in 
generating inventive activity, versus a lack of social networks to commercialize the 
patents produced?  Patent citations are being matched to the database to measure the 
correlation between assignments and later assessments of technological significance.  
High-citation southern patents without marketable assignments could indicate the degree 
to which successful southern inventors chose not to assign,
10 or could be evidence of the 
South’s disconnect from the patent system’s social network that prevented promising 
technologies from profitable commercialization.
11  Finally, if lack of access to a social 
network was preventing southern entrepreneurs from starting new technology-based 
firms, how much impact could it have had on southern economic growth?  
                                                 
10 Southern inventors could have chosen to license or rent their technology, which would not have shown 
up in the Patent Office records (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999, p. 10).  However, it would be expected that 
northern inventors would have had greater licensing activity than southern patentees, similar to their 
advantage in assignments. 
11 Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999, Table 4) found a shortage of patent attorneys in the South, which could 
be associated with social network isolation.  Carlton and Coclanis (2003, p. 115) have connected this 
attorney deficit to a general shortage of intermediary institutions in the South. Democratization of Invention-17   
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Sources: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents (Washington, D.C.) and 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 
1975).  The Southern region is defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy, plus 
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TABLE 1 
PATENTING RATE BY SOUTHERN STATE AND REGION: 
1836-45 AND 1906-12 annual average (per million census-year population) 
 
Region Rank    State    Patent Rate(36-45)         Region Rank    State    Patent Rate(06-12) 
2
nd                    VA                   9.28                    1
st                     WV                181.88 
3
rd                    KY                   7.05                    4
th                     VA                 124.95 
                                                                            5
th                     KY                 118.30 
Border State Average              8.42                                                                    134.69 
 
1
st                     LA                   9.93                    2
nd                     TX                141.51 
4
th                     AL                   6.09                    3
rd                     FL                 139.91 
5
th                     SC                   4.88                    6
th                     TN                 112.28 
6
th                     TN                   3.74                    7
th                     LA                 104.51 
7
th                     MS                  3.46                     8
th                    GA                   91.18 
8
th                     GA                  2.89                     9
th                    AR                   84.28 
9
th                     NC                  2.52                    10
th                   NC                   78.82 
                                                                            11
th                   AL                   75.49 
                                                                            12
th                   MS                  60.10 
                                                                            13
th                   SC                   48.57 
Deep South Average                4.22                                                                     96.53 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents (Washington, D.C.) and 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 
1975). 
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TABLE 2 
PATENTING RATE BY MAJOR CITY AND HINTERLAND 
1846-55 Annual Average and 1912 (per million census-year population) 
 
Patents(46-55)          Patent Rate(46-55)          Patents(1912)          Patent Rate(1912) 
 
Charleston 
  1.7 per year              39.55 per million                    8                     135.98 per million 
Rest of South Carolina 
  1.6 per year                2.56 per million                  76                       52.18 per million 
 
New Orleans 
  5.1 per year              43.82 per million                  80                      235.94 per million 
Rest of Louisiana 
  1.6 per year                3.99 per million                123                        93.37 per million 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents (Washington, D.C.) and Eighth 
Census of the United States for 1860, vol. 1, and Thirteenth Census of the United States 
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TABLE 3 
CLASSIFICATION OF ASSIGNED PATENTS 
SOUTHERN INVENTORS(1912) 
 
Assignment Type                     Number     Percent     Assignee Type     Number     Percent 
 
Marketable Assignments           200         39.9% 
                                                                     Independent Company         123         24.6% 
                                                                     Own Company                        42           8.4% 
                                                      Full Assign to Unrelated Person          35            7.0% 
 
Other Assignments                    301          60.1% 
                                                    Partial Assign to Unrelated Person     263          52.5% 
                                                                     Relative                                   27            5.4% 
                                                                     Co-inventor                             11            2.2% 
 
Total Assignments                                                                                     501 











Quantity of Marketable 
Assignments 




















Quantity of Marketable 
Assignments 














 Democratization of Invention-24   
TABLE 4 
ASSIGNMENT RATES BY SOUTHERN STATE(1912) 
(per million 1910 population) 
 
State        Marketable Assign      % of Patents      Marketable Assign      Total Assign Rate 
                          Rate                   w/ Mkt Assn               Number 
WV           18.02 per million             10.5%                        22                   37.67 per million 
KY            14.85 per million             14.3%                        34                   24.02 per million 
VA            14.55 per million             10.8%                        30                   30.07 per million 
 
FL             13.29 per million               8.1%                        10                   29.90 per million 
TX              7.44 per million               5.3%                         29                  24.12 per million 
LA              7.24 per million               5.9%                         12                  19.32 per million 
GA             6.13 per million                6.7%                         16                  15.14 per million 
NC             5.89 per million                7.7%                         13                  13.14 per million 
TN             5.49 per million                5.7%                         12                  18.77 per million 
SC             5.28 per million                9.5%                           8                  10.56 per million 
AL             3.74 per million                4.5%                           8                  15.43 per million 
AR             1.91 per million                2.2%                           3                  13.34 per million 
MS            1.67 per million                 3.0%                           3                    5.56 per million 
Sources: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents for 1912 (Washington, D.C.) 
and Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 
1975). 
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TABLE 5 
MARKETABLE ASSIGNMENT RATES BY REGION AND URBANIZATION(1912) 
(per million 1910 population) 
 
Region       Marketable Assign     Urban/Rural     Marketable Assign    Marketable Assign 
                            Rate                                                    Number                       Rate 
Border States 
                    15.43 per million          Urban                        63                    61.45 per million 
                                                         (13 counties) 
 
                                                          Rural                         23                      5.06 per million 
Deep South States 
                      5.61 per million           Urban                      60.5                  22.39 per million 
                                                          (26 counties) 
 
                                                           Rural                       53.5                    3.03 per million 
Sources: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents for 1912 (Washington, D.C.) 
and Thirteenth Census of the United States for 1910, vols. 1-3 (Washington, D.C.).  
Border States’ urban counties (by state) are: Kentucky-Campbell (Newport/Cincinnati), 
Fayette (Lexington), Jefferson (Louisville) and Kenton (Covington/Cincinnati); Virginia-
Alexandria (Washington, DC), Campbell (Lynchburg), Henrico (Richmond), Norfolk 
(Norfolk/Portsmouth) and Roanoke; West Virginia-Brooke (Wheeling/Pittsburgh), Cabell 
(Huntington), Marshall (Wheeling/Pittsburgh), and Ohio (Wheeling/Pittsburgh).  Deep 
South States’ urban counties (by state) are: Alabama-Jefferson (Birmingham), Mobile 
and Montgomery; Arkansas-Pulaski (Little Rock); Florida-Duval (Jacksonville) and 
Hillsboro (Tampa/St. Petersburg); Georgia-Bibb (Macon), Chatham (Savannah), DeKalb 
(Decatur/Atlanta), Fulton (Atlanta), and Richmond (Augusta); Louisiana-Orleans (New 
Orleans); Mississippi-none; North Carolina-Mecklenburg (Charlotte); South Carolina-
Charleston; Tennessee-Davidson (Nashville), Hamilton (Chattanooga), Knox 
(Knoxville), and Shelby (Memphis); Texas-Bexar (San Antonio), Dallas, El Paso, 
Galveston, Harris (Houston), Parker (Ft. Worth), Tarrant (Ft. Worth) and Travis (Austin).  
Selection procedures for urban counties are described in the text.  
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